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Abstract: The postwar motorization boom in Western Europe implicated rising complaints 
about road vehicle noise. By the end of the 1960s, traffic noise abatement became an 
urgent topic for European regulators and automobile engineers. The article investigates 
how car sound, its measurement and the standardization of measurement procedures 
developed during the first postwar decades, and how this relates to European integration. It 
shows that the standardization of car noise measurement affected market integration and 
the harmonization of technical regulation on the European level, thus shaping the political 
integration process. Furthermore, standardization and harmonization stimulated the 
circulation of knowledge and the rise of a new field of knowledge organized around the 
standardized and harmonized issues. Although the standardization and harmonization 
efforts did not result in the homogenization of European automobile technology, they did 
contribute to the narrative construction of a European car identity. 
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In the first postwar decades, European countries, especially West Germany, Italy, France 
and the United Kingdom, experienced an exceptional motorization boom. During the 
1950s only, the joint passenger car production of these countries almost quadrupled.1 At 
the same time car tourism became more and more popular.2 In the United States, too, every 
year produced a new record for vehicle-miles traveled. In 1951, the U.S. Bureau of Public 
Roads exclaimed helplessly, “we are being overwhelmed by a flood of traffic.”3 The 
drawback of this automobile success story was an equally dramatic rise in environmental 
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pollution caused by motorized road traffic.4 One of the major concerns, especially in urban 
areas, was traffic noise.5 As a countermeasure, engineers and regulators soon considered 
setting noise emission limits for new passenger cars, which required standardized 
techniques for measuring exterior car noise. Such standards were first discussed within the 
domestic framework of several countries, although increasing international car trade and 
cross-border traffic pointed out that the car noise problem could hardly be solved on the 
level of individual nation states. At the end of the 1950s, the call for international 
regulations grew louder: in particular in Western Europe.6 
 
Several international organizations took part in negotiating and coordinating the 
technical and political questions of car noise abatement: The International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), which included European nations and the U.S. among its members, 
dealt with the definition of a common standard for setting and measuring exterior car 
noise. Organizations like the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE, 
established in 1947) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD, established in 1961) discussed limits on car noise and the mutual recognition of 
national regulations and procedures. Both organizations were founded to stimulate the 
economic reconstruction and progress in Europe after the Second World War. The 
UNECE, with one focus on cross-border transport, had members from both sides of the 
iron curtain, whereas the OECD members were limited to Western Europe. Finally, the 
European Economic Community (EEC, often referred to as the Common Market, had 
originally as members West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) 
adopted a common policy on car noise abatement. These groups requested the ISO and its 
experts to define an international standard method of measuring the noise produced by 
automobiles. Their challenges were several. ‘Noise’ and ‘loudness’ were subjective 
perceptions—individually, nationally, and culturally—and were politically fraught. Not 
surprisingly, prior efforts, in Western European nations and in the U.S, to establish noise 
standards used different approaches. Last, the ISO process itself was collegial and 
agreement on a standard did not require member nations to adopt it. Within this context, 
the ISO sought to address this tangle of political, technical, and cultural issues to create a 
international standard, resulting in ISO 362, issued in 1964. 
 
ISO’s work, de facto, became primarily a European standard, as the U.S. chose to 
keep its own different, national standard. In 1968, a first political accord on maximum 
noise levels was reached under the auspices of the UNECE (with the U.S. the lone non-
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European member), but, again, the United States chose not to join this agreement. 
Commenting on the lack of American participation, the OECD (which also included the 
U.S. as a member) concluded that ‘Europe’ alone sought a common solution to the traffic 
noise problem.7 Still, the European situation was more complex than the OECD statement 
suggests because the six Common Market countries did not join the UNECE agreement 
either, but issued their own maximum noise limit. The history of car noise abatement 
shows that multiple ‘Europes’ with different political and geographical agendas were 
dealing with the same subject. For the six Common Market countries, for example, traffic 
noise abatement was part of the process of economic and political integration that was the 
aim of their supranational organization. In comparison, negotiations under the auspice of 
the UNECE, with its larger number of members, were seen primarily as technical 
discussions, in which Eastern and Western European countries could jointly take part. 
Intersecting with these perspectives was the large role that U.S. played in postwar Europe. 
As the OECD statement suggests, that the conduct of the United States played a crucial 
part in shaping the impression of a distinct ‘European’ solution to the traffic noise 
problem. 
 
In recent years, historians of technology have actively studied the relationship 
between technology and European integration.8 In an agenda-setting paper, Johan Schot 
and Ruth Oldenziel argued that “material networks, technical systems, and the circulation 
of knowledge and artefacts” significantly influenced this integration.9 Because these 
authors felt that scholars of European integration had underestimated, if not neglected, the 
crucial role of design and use of technology in the shaping of Europe, its institutions and 
identity,10 they coined the notion of Europe’s ‘hidden integration.’11 Much recent 
scholarship sustains the claim of a co-construction of Europe, as a geographical and 
imaginary space, and infrastructure-related technologies.12 What a large number of these 
publications have in common is a clear focus on network technologies and large-scale 
technological projects.13 For example, Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers have 
described transnational infrastructures such as roads, railways, electricity and broadcasting 
networks as “material links between nations and across borders in Europe.”14 In this 
domain, transnational infrastructures serve as integrating technologies sui generis—as 
evident material links enabling a bottom-up integration of Europe. In the same line of 
reasoning, Johan Schot and Frank Schipper have emphasized the role of technical experts 
in the integration process. They draw on the epistemic community concept to explain how 
expert committees on the international level “technify discussions and make clear-cut 
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distinctions between technical and political issues, hence to arrange for decisions without 
any interference of politics.”15 Epistemic communities can be understood as networks of 
experts with an authoritative voice in defining problems and identifying solutions to 
policy-relevant issues. As ‘hidden integrators,’ they shape standards, norms and rules, 
which subsequently, as a regulatory regime, affect the integration of politics and markets.16 
 
In several ways the case of car noise abatement can be said to complement the 
above findings. It contributed to European integration in terms of regulatory regimes, but 
also stimulated the circulation of knowledge and the rise of new fields of knowledge 
organized around problems raised through standardization and international collaboration. 
A focus on the history of car noise abatement in the 1960s and 1970s allows one to identify 
additional forms of integration, notably in terms of identity. Among automobile engineers, 
car noise abatement, as the first environmental issue to be solved on a European level, 
triggered the emergence of a “common European consciousness” in Western Europe.17 
European car noise abatement also stimulated the cross-border circulation of people, 
knowledge and automobiles. With this turn, given the dramatic postwar rise of automobile 
production and consumption, this relation between the ‘European’ automobile and 
‘European’ identity had a larger cultural resonance. In this sense, ISO recommendation 362 
and the noise limits of EEC and UNECE can be understood as critical events that gave 
‘Europe’ new importance and meaning, among engineers and policy elites and, then 
indirectly, a broader European public. In this process of identity formation, the United 
States, in its choice to pursue its own national rather international standards, acted as a 
catalyzing force that helped shape the notion that ‘Europe’ was seeking a common 
approach to traffic noise abatement. 
 
To develop my argument below I draw on sources from automobile and noise 
control engineering trade journals,18 conference proceedings and reports from national and 
international institutions. In addition, I have used archival material to describe the 
negotiations about ISO standard 362. In the first section I provide a brief historical 
overview of the postwar motorization boom and rising complaints about traffic noise in 
Europe and the United States. The following section focuses on the negotiations leading to 
international car noise measurement standard ISO 362, and its perception as a European 
standard. Section three covers the broader landscape of international car noise legislation, 
where standardization and harmonization of technical regulation served as means of 
market integration while simultaneously causing market fragmentation between the U.S. 
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and Europe. The next section addresses the circulation and appropriation of noise control 
knowledge, highlighting that ISO 362 stimulated the rise of the new field of (car) noise 
control engineering. The final section investigates the discursive construction of a 
European car identity. The notion of a ‘European’ automotive community became 
conjoined with the concurrent discussion on car noise control, and, in both cases, was 
reinforced by highlighting the differences between European and American car 
technology, engineering methods and noise abatement policies. 
 
Postwar Motorization, International Car Trade and the Rise of the Traffic Noise 
Problem 
 
The 35th edition of the Automobile Salon in Paris, 1948, presented the first European 
postwar models ready for production and served as a prelude to the unprecedented 
motorization boom in Western Europe.19 Fostered by the ‘economic miracle’ of the late 
1950s, Europeans longed to have and were moved to purchase a car of their own.20 In the 
four main producing countries—United Kingdom, France, Italy and West Germany21—
production numbers grew steadily during the first postwar decades (see Table I). 
 
In 1953, German manufacturers surpassed their prewar production numbers for the 
first time. Another three years later, Germany also became the number one automobile 
manufacturer of Europe. But while leading in car production, Germany was still lagging 
behind in postwar motorization: at the beginning of the decade, only 1.25 million 
passenger cars circulated on German roads, compared to 3.3 million cars in the United 
Kingdom, and 2.75 million cars in France. At that time, car density in Germany was as low 
as 13 cars per 1,000 inhabitants, compared to 47 cars in Britain, or 38 cars in France.22 The 
difference between the high production numbers and relative low numbers of car 
ownership in Germany resulted from the very low starting point of car ownership after the 
war and the large export numbers. In 1953, 32.2 percent of the total German production 
was sold outside Western Germany. In Europe, only the UK had a higher export share: due 
to high subsidies 69.2 percent of the domestic production was exported.23 
 
On 25 March 1957, the treaty that formalized the creation of the EEC was signed in 
Rome. To establish a customs union between the six member states, a gradual reduction of 
tariffs and quotas in intra-Community trade started as of January 1, 1959. Still in 1958, the 
French automobile market was protected by a 34.7 percent import tariff on foreign 
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vehicles. The German import policy was less strict with a tariff of 14.8 percent, while the 
Italian market was protected by a prohibitive import duty of up to 46.8 percent (depending 
on engine size). Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands had tariffs between 25.9 and 
27.9 percent.24 In view of these tariffs it is no surprise that import shares were small: in 
Italy and France two percent, in Germany five percent of the total registrations. Prior to the 
EEC, the automobile markets in individual European countries were largely separated from 
each other.25 
 
In July 1968, the transition period for the establishment of a common policy on 
customs was completed: all internal EEC automobile tariffs were abandoned and an import 
duty of 17.6 percent for all non-EEC countries was imposed. This development stimulated 
intra-Community trade, of course, and it transformed the European automobile market 
significantly. In 1959, for example, French cars were exported to traditional European 
markets, such as Belgium and Switzerland, and to the French overseas territories. Overall, 
45.6 percent of the country’s annual production was sold abroad. A decade later, the export 
share of French carmakers was still around 45 percent, but now, about 40 percent of these 
were exported to other EEC members, another 35 percent going to other European 
countries. This trend also was evident in the other Common Market countries.26 Import 
shares among these countries grew considerably as well: to 22.2 percent in Germany, to 
22.4 percent in France and to 15.2 percent in Italy.27  
 
One can say that the formation of the Common Market stimulated the circulation of 
automobiles in Europe, both literally, on the road, and figuratively, as one of the pivotal 
postwar consumer goods. In everyday life, various European car makes, from and in 
different countries, increasingly became a familiar sight, in particular passenger cars of 
leading brands such as Fiat, Volkswagen, PSA and Renault.28 At the same time, integration 
of national markets continued to be moderate because “the lion’s share of intra-community 
trade for private motorcars had a complementary rather than a substitutive character.”29 
Thus, European manufacturers did not compete in the same market segments and overall 
competition across borders was compatatively low. For example, German manufacturers 
like Opel, Ford and Mercedes competed in the higher middle-class and the upper price 
segment, while French manufacturers Citroën and Renault were strong in the lower 
middle-class and low-priced segment. From an economic perspective, the formation of the 
Common Market only transformed ‘tight’ national oligopolies into ‘wide’ supranational 
oligopolies.30 
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Compared to the European situation, the U.S. market was predominatly self-
contained. In 1955, American manufacturers sold a record-breaking 7.9 million cars, of 
which the Big Three—General Motors, Chrysler and Ford—sold 95 percent. Overall, about 
99.7 percent of the cars sold that year were of domestic origin.31 From 1956 onwards, the 
picture began to change.32 While the Big Three faced, in 1958 alone, a slump of their sales 
by more than 45 percent, European imports soared to 11 percent in 1959. At the same time, 
U.S. manufacturers like American Motors successfully introduced new ‘European size’ 
cars.33 In response to the threat of rising European imports, the Big Three introduced their 
1960-compacts, which put an end to the car size and horse power race that had defined the 
American automobile industry after 1945.34 A major difference between American and 
European manufacturers pertained to their export policy. Italian, French and German 
manufacturers were emphatically export-oriented and, in 1969, their export shares reached 
between 39.7 and 57.5 percent of their annual production. At the same time, the U.S. 
export share stood at 4.1 percent of annual production volume (see Table II). In absolute 
numbers, exports amounted to only 335,000 units. In comparison, more than 2.18 million 
European cars were sold to the United States and the rest of the world.35 Because of their 
export orientation, European manufacturers had an economic interest in market integration 
and reduction of obstacles to international car trade. 
 
In spite of differences in production numbers, export strategies and national car 
ownership figures, European and North-American countries all were confronted with the 
drawbacks of the automobile ‘success story’: a rise in environmental problems. Air 
pollution36 and traffic noise had gradually evolved into urgent societal concerns.37 A 
German survey, sponsored by the Medical Academy Düsseldorf and published in 1953, 
revealed that, in comparison to the situation in 1938, the average noise level in urban areas 
had increased by nine phon, which equals almost a doubling of perceived loudness.38 The 
authors concluded that only new regulatory measurements could prevent a further rise of 
traffic noise. In the following year, the German Anti-noise League took up this line of 
reasoning and proposed the introduction of a noise tax for motor vehicles.39 Another 
reaction on the institutional level was the initiative of German, French, Austrian and Suisse 
anti-noise societies to found an international non-governmental organization, the 
Association International Contre le Bruit (AICB), in 1959. General secretary O. Schenker-
Sprüngli declared that AICB’s “[g]oal is the international promotion of noise abatement, 
the fostering of cooperation and exchange of experiences, and the preparation of 
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international measures.”40 Looking back at the 1960s, the editors of the journal 
Transportation summed up the urban traffic noise problem: “Although the characteristics 
of both urban form and the motor vehicle population, as well as community standards and 
values, vary widely throughout the world, the basic problem is always present, whether it 
is due to five liter American automobiles on the freeways of Los Angeles or the ear-
splitting scream of 50-cc motorcycles reverberating through the narrow streets of an 
historic European town.”41 
 
The prelude to postwar traffic noise abatement was the widely recognized Wilson 
Committee report, published in 1963. The report was commissioned by the British 
government “to examine the nature, sources and effects of noise and to advise what further 
measures can be taken to mitigate it.”42 In regard to vehicle noise, the report highlighted 
that “the results at about 400 points of the survey have been analyzed, and the most 
important conclusion is that at 84 per cent of these points noise from road traffic 
predominated.”43 Accordingly, the committee concluded that in large towns road traffic 
noise dominated all other noise sources.44 The report identified “the lack of numerical 
definition of ‘excessive noise’”45 as a major obstacle in developing recommendations for 
traffic noise abatement, but did note that “a satisfactory method of measuring the 
maximum noise which a vehicle can emit,”46 did exist.47 The Wilson report, together with 
German, French and Italian studies, was presented at the 1967 meeting of the Permanent 
International Association of Road Congresses, the international organization of road 
experts and authorities. With reference to these reports, the working group on urban road 
construction concluded that “[n]oise caused by vehicular traffic has become so great that it 
is now harmful to the health of residents along streets. Since most of the causes are on the 
automobile side, much effort should be made for automobiles of less noise.”48 As a 
consequence, political interest grew in developing international maximum noise limits for 
new passenger cars. 
 
ISO 362: Creating a European ‘International Standard’ 
 
Even before these discussions were underway, the search for an accepted procedure for 
setting noise standards had started during the 1950s. Below I first consider national 
activities in Germany and France before describing the international process, which 
culminated in the adoption of ISO recommendation 362 in 1964. 
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The German Road Traffic Act, re-enacted in 1949,49 described two noise measuring 
techniques: a stationary test, which measured exhaust noise within a 7 meter range, was 
used for practical, on the road enforcement of the imposed noise limit. A pass-by test, 
which measured the noise of a single car with wide open throttle at 40 km/h from a 
distance of 7 meters, was used for approval of manufacturer car-types. The latter test was 
rather tricky to perform, as the driver had to operate at full throttle and to break at the same 
time to stay within the speed limit. In 1954, the type-approval method was questioned at a 
meeting of the noise abatement section of the Verein Deutscher Ingenieure. Alfons Stadie 
proposed an alternative pass-by acceleration test. He argued that results of this test would 
be more reliable.50 He further criticized that the Road Traffic Act listed another special 
method for diesel engines, and that the Swiss regulation used three different methods, 
which slightly differed from those advocated in Germany. Stadie complained about the 
current situation and claimed that international harmonization was needed.51 By contrast, 
Gisbert Bobbert, from the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt, defended the test 
methods as technically sound. He argued that from an engineering perspective different 
vehicle types needed different measuring approaches.52 He investigated the regulation in an 
extensive test series, conducted between 1950 and 1954. He identified four variables that 
were of major influence on the test results: measuring distance, engine revolutions, engine 
power and drive-by speed. Still, in his opinion, the actual regulation was a fair compromise 
between simplicity and adequacy, even though it was far from optimal.53 
 
A parallel discussion started in France when the traffic noise legislation was 
amended in 1957. A first regulation introduced in 1954 lacked a practicable measuring 
technique. 54 The new regulation stipulated precise measuring conditions and noise limits 
for different vehicle categories. For example, the measuring distance was 10 meters, while 
the drive-by speed varied between 40 and 60 km/h for different vehicle categories. 
However, the procedures were difficult to apply in practice. In some cases, moreover, test 
conditions did not match real driving conditions, distorting the results. At the end of 1957, 
the French Ministry of Transportation entrusted the Commission d’Etudes du Bruit des 
Véhicules Automobiles to develop a new technique for car noise measurements.55 
 
In the same time frame at ISO, the Technical Committee for Road Vehicles (TC 22) 
asked the Committee for Acoustics (TC 43) to develop an international car noise measuring 
standard. In July 1958, Working Group no. 7 (WG 7) was formed and appointed to work 
on a draft method of measurement of traffic noise.56 The first step was to study existing 
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measuring techniques. The working group distinguished four principal methods: the 
German, the Italian and the French method, as well as that of the American Society of 
Automobile Engineers (SAE). In the end, the group members dismissed all four methods 
and decided to develop a new measuring technique: a standard which should combine a 
realistic driving scenario with the basic testing norms of reproducibility and simplicity, the 
latter also a condition to keep testing costs low.57 Based on work of the Commission 
d’Etudes du Bruit des Véhicules Automobiles, the French delegation proposed a drive-by 
test with full throttle acceleration from a given speed, which was seen as a typical urban 
driving situation.58 This idea was taken up and in 1961 a first draft version appeared as ISO 
419 ‘Method of measurement of noise emitted by vehicles’; it was commented on by TC 
22 and the ISO member bodies. Several editorial comments had to be taken into account, 
but finally, in February 1964, the second draft was accepted by the ISO Council and issued 
as ISO 362-1964.59 The most important test regulation concerned the test site conditions, 
the setup of the measuring equipment (at 7.5 meters), the driving conditions (full throttle 
acceleration from 50 km/h) and the measuring method itself. For the latter, International 
Electrotechnical Commission approved sound level meters were prescribed, which would 
assure both the practicability and reproducibility of the test. 
 
The measuring results had to be given in decibel weighting system scale ‘A’ 
(dB(A)). This system was based on frequency correction factors, which placed less 
emphasis on low frequency sound and provided more weight to middle and high frequency 
sounds between 500 and 6000 Hertz, typically perceived as the most annoying by 
listeners.60 Up to that time, national measurement methods had preferred other units: sone 
(USA), phon (France) and DIN-phon (Germany). Prior to the decision for dB(A), members 
of ad hoc Group E within WG 7 conducted several test series. Results of these tests were 
presented to WG 7 and, after a long discussion, a majority of the group members voted for 
dB(A).61 It was argued that dB(A) was best suited to correlate the annoyance factor of car 
noise to an objective measurement. 
 
It can be assumed that the British members in WG 7 played a key role in favor of 
dB(A): H.G. Mills from the Motor Industry Research Association and D.W. Robinson 
from the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) were leading experts in noise control 
research. They had conducted extensive jury tests to “establish a relationship between the 
subjective rating of noise emitted by motor vehicles, and objective measurements made 
with a sound level meter employing ‘A’ weighting.”62 NPL scientists had a long tradition 
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of jury testing that went back to the 1920s—a particular British practice in noise 
measurement described in detail by Karin Bijsterveld.63 With reference to Mills and 
Robinson, contemporary noise control handbooks adopted the British standpoint and 
agreed that “practical work has indicated that numerical dB(A) values can be directly 
related to a subjective scale with a good measure of agreement between independent 
observers.”64 T. Priede from the Southampton Institute of Sound and Vibration Research 
emphasized that Mills and Robinson had “shown conclusively in the investigation of 
subjective rating of motor vehicle noise that a linear relation exists between the pure 
physical measurements with sound level meter ‘A’ weighting network in dBA units and 
the subjective rating of the noise such as quiet, acceptable, noisy, and excessively noisy.”65 
Accordingly, dB(A) seemed to be the perfect compromise between simple, reliable and 
inexpensive measurements. Still, even ad hoc Group E had to admit certain limitations: 
thus “it may also be necessary at some future date to replace the A weighting network of 
the sound level meter with another weighting.”66 
 
The history of ISO 362 reveals that central test conditions were derived from 
national measuring standards. Test site size, ambient conditions and measuring distance 
evolved from the German car noise regulation, driving conditions were proposed by 
French experts and the use of dB(A) can be traced back to British members in TC 43. 
American test preferences did not play a part in the consensus: neither the American 
measuring distance of 15 meters, nor the preferred unit of ‘sone’ became part of ISO 362. 
In other words, the new international standard was an integration of three European car 
sound measuring traditions. This European bias suggests that experts from European 
member bodies recognized the economic arguments and gains of integration, and that they 
used their majority within WG 7 to define a standard that was close to existing regulations 
in Europe. Historical and social studies of standardization processes have shown that 
political negotiations are always involved, “also when non-political matters such as 
technical norms and standards … have to be decided.”67 Participants of TC 43 regarded 
themselves as neutral technical experts that prepared expert decisions on the basis of 
technical arguments. One Dutch member of TC 43, though, accused the American 
delegation that their rejection of ISO 362 was based on political, not technical, reasons.68 
One, thus, may well consider ISO 362 perhaps not a mere engineering solution, but a 
practicable political compromise—based on European expert knowledge. 
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Harmonizing the Fragmented Car Noise Legislation Landscape 
 
The adoption of an international car sound measuring standard was only the first step; the 
next step was to include it in national or international traffic noise legislation. For the 
1960s, existing traffic noise legislation can be divided in two principal categories. One 
consisted of non-technical language that prohibited, for example, “excessive objectionable 
noise” of vehicles on the road.69 Such regulations had little impact on traffic noise 
abatement as they were hard to enforce: after all, how might excessive noise be objectively 
rated? The second type of legislation imposed numerical noise limits. Here, the 
specification of functional test conditions was crucial. The second category can be further 
divided into stationary tests for the measurements of road traffic and drive-by tests for 
rating and approval of various car types. The following sections will focus on the latter 
sub-category, because it affected the automotive industry directly. I first offer a brief 
sketch of the international traffic noise legislation landscape, before investigating 
initiatives for international harmonization of regulation. 
 
Though Germany and France had both adopted noise control legislation with 
numerical limits for type-approval by the mid-1950s, car noise abatement in other 
countries was still in it’s infancy. A comparative survey, published in 1971, pointed out 
that 15 out of 29 countries under investigation had only general regulation without 
numerical limits and no specific measuring procedures.70 Four nations had imposed 
numerical limits in combination with a stationary test,71 and ten countries had laid down 
numerical limits and a drive-by test.72 For the countries with numerical limits, current 
regulation for passenger cars ranged from 75 to 93 dB.73 The span of 18 dB is quite 
remarkable, as it equals, due to the logarithmic scale of the decibel, a 3.48-fold increase of 
perceived loudness. Several different measuring units were used—sone, phon and DIN-
phon, decibel, and decibel with ‘A’ or ‘B’ scale weightings—while the test conditions 
revealed a similarly scattered picture.74 
 
The many differences in regulation posed a serious obstacle to international 
automobile trade and circulation, therefore manufacturers75 and policymakers76 demanded 
international harmonization of car noise regulations. Thereby they could build on existing 
agreements to harmonize vehicle regulation. Already in June 1952 the Working Party on 
the Construction of Vehicles (WP 29) had been established within the framework of the 
UNECE. Initially, nine countries and five non-governmental organizations were active. In 
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1956, an important step was taken, when Germany, France and Italy, as leading car 
exporting nations, and the Netherlands, as importing country, signed a first agreement in 
Rome “on the subject of adoption of uniform and harmonized requirements for headlamps 
emitting an asymmetrical passing beam.”77 Two years later, Germany took the initiative 
and proposed that an agreement be established under the auspices of UNECE “in order to 
facilitate the adoption of uniform conditions of approval and the reciprocal recognition of 
approval for motor vehicle equipment and parts.”78 The agreement was signed in Geneva, 
20 March 1958, by several European countries. 
 
Subsequently, WP 29 became a central market place for the circulation of 
knowledge in the field of international vehicle standards. UNECE also took the lead to find 
an agreement on international norms for vehicle noise emissions. Not surprisingly, given 
this history of collaboration, ISO 362 was quickly adopted by the UNECE as common test 
method and the ‘European compromise’ entered the policy process as non-political 
international standard. In the following years WP 29 and ISO TC 43 cooperated closely 
and tried to synchronize their working schedules.79 After the test standard was adopted 
there was still disagreement within WP 29 on numerical noise limits. Finally, in 1968 a 
noise limit of 84 dB(A) for new passenger cars was accepted. As this threshold was above 
the current regulation in Germany and France these countries did not sign the UNECE 
agreement. 
 
Instead, the EEC started to negotiate an additional agreement with stricter limits. In 
February 1970, Council Directive 70/157 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the permissible sound level and the exhaust system of motor vehicle was 
issued. It adopted the measurement technique of ISO 362, too, and imposed a noise limit of 
82 dB(A) for passenger car type-approval.80 The six Common Market countries had to 
implement this directive as part of their national regulation within 18 months. With the 
expansion of the Common Market in 1973, Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom also 
had to adopt the EEC directive on vehicle noise. Another four years later, Directive 77/212 
lowered the noise limit for passenger cars to 80 dB(A).81 
 
To understand the full impact of traffic noise regulation on the integration of the 
European automotive field, the simultaneously adopted EEC Council Directive 70/156 has 
to be taken into account. This directive was a precondition to establish a Community 
policy on car noise abatement. It declared that because “in each Member State motor 
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vehicles intended for the carriage of goods or passengers must comply with certain 
mandatory technical requirements” and because “such requirements differ from one 
Member State to another and consequently hinder trade within the European Economic 
Community,”82 the introduction of a Community type-approval procedure and the 
reciprocal recognition of national compliance checks was necessary for the proper 
functioning of the Common Market. In principle, Council Directive 70/156 facilitated and 
accelerated the circulation of EEC-manufactured cars between the member states. The first 
technical directive that made use of the new Community type-approval was the one on car 
noise emissions—highlighting the importance of the harmonization of traffic noise 
abatement as a stimulus for economic and political integration of the European automotive 
field, because it paved the way for future EEC regulations in the automobile sector.83 
 
Directive 70/157 and the concomitantly adopted Community type-approval 
procedure can be depicted as symbolic cornerstones of market integration. Marine 
Moguen-Toursel pointed out that “for Community institutions, it was important to show 
that the type-approval procedure functioned well on a product as important as a car.”84 
However, the practice of Community type-approval proved to be difficult. Member states 
used national road safety issues or other “requirements that remained applicable in respect 
of parts and characteristics which were not yet covered by separate Community directives” 
as means to protect the national car industry by denying simple recognition of foreign type-
approval certificates.85 It was not before January 1, 1996—when Council Directive 92/53, 
which amended directive 70/156, became mandatory—that all national type-approval 
systems got replaced by a single Community procedure.86 
 
Besides UNECE and EEC initiatives, a third strand of international action was 
instigated by the OECD. In 1971, OECD’s Consultative Group on Transportation 
Research entrusted an expert group to formulate recommendations for international vehicle 
noise regulation. The expert committee prepared a report that was approved by OECD and 
published in 1972.87 The report stated: “Standards for new vehicles should be expressed in 
terms of maximum permissible noise levels as measured by test procedures recommended 
by the International Standards Organisation.”88 The exemplary UNECE and EEC activities 
were welcomed, but seen only as a first step. All countries were encouraged to support 
R&D efforts in the field of noise reduction, which included research on effects of noise 
exposure, on the development of measuring and monitoring instruments, and car noise 
reduction technology.89 The OECD report had no direct influence on national legislation, 
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but it played an important role in promoting international vehicle noise regulation, as it 
was well-received in different automotive trade journals and conference proceedings. For 
example, a summary was published in the U.S. SAE journal under the telling title “Europe 
seeks common solutions to problems of emissions & noise.”90 
 
The United States neither joined the UNECE agreement nor followed the OECD 
recommendations. With the enactment of the Noise Control Act (NCA) in 1972, though, 
the federal government launched an initiative of its own. Initially, the NCA was seen as an 
important step to abate vehicle noise as it explicitly aimed at surface transportation noise. 
However, because of the primary responsibility of states and municipalities no federal 
regulation on passenger car noise was issued. The Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) issued a limit of 86/90 dB(A) only for trucks. This EPA action was justified with 
reference to the federal responsibility for interstate commerce.91 Meanwhile, states like 
California, Minnesota and Colorado, and individual cities, such as Chicago, imposed their 
own regulation. Maximum noise limits differed significantly, but all regulation referred to 
SAE 986a, the U.S. standard of car noise measuring for car type-approval.92 The 
emergence of this standard will be discussed in the next section. 
 
At the end of the 1970s, the bigger picture of international car noise regulation 
showed an inner circle consisting of the nine Common Market countries with one common 
regulation based on ISO 362. Around this core, a corona of other countries adopted the 
UNECE recommendation, also integrating the ISO test procedure into their national 
legislation. Lastly, the United States pursued an independent position with different state 
and city regulations, based on SAE test procedures. Compared to the U.S. situation, 
European harmonization of car noise standards had made great progress. This development 
was strengthened by the concurrent adoption of a single type-approval procedure that 
removed non-tariff trade barriers between Common Market countries. Moreover, the 
UNECE agreement also facilitated the automotive trade between the Common Market and 
other European countries. This development was reflected in a rising import and export 
trade for Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom.93 Thus, the ‘European 
compromise’ inscribed in ISO 362, which became part of EEC and UNECE regulation on 
car noise, contributed to the economic and political integration process in Europe—even 
beyond the Common Market. 
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The Circulation and Appropriation of Car Noise Control Knowledge 
 
The endorsement of ISO 362 in 1964 had, at first sight, little impact on the circulation of 
noise control knowledge. The new test setup was occasionally discussed in trade journals, 
and at the 1966 conference of the International Federation of Automotive Engineering 
Societies (FISITA), British engineers presented an extensive survey on vehicle noise.94 
Still, it was not until the approval of EEC Council Directive 70/157 and the 1972 U.S. 
Noise Control Act that exterior noise control became a frequent topic for automotive 
engineers. A survey of trade journals and conference proceedings shows a peak in 
presentations and articles on noise control after 1970 (see Table III and Figure 1). In 1972 
alone, 65 papers were published in the SAE transactions from several national and regional 
conferences.95 And, in the same year, the FISITA conference hosted for the first time a car 
noise panel with 17 papers. FISITA also organized special noise panels in 1976 and 1978. 
Here, engineers presented their latest findings on car noise control: for example, different 
ways to reduce noise from specific car components such as the clutch, brakes, exhaust and 
intake. Overall, automotive engineers recognized car noise reduction as a priority design 
goal, but they also discussed target conflicts with other design goals such as safety and fuel 
economy.96 
 
A close reading of the different papers reveals, however, that ISO 362 had a 
significant impact on the development of knowledge on noise control. For the first time, 
British, French, German, and even Hungarian and Japanese engineers applied the same test 
methods. Moreover, the common test procedure allowed automobile engineers to directly 
compare their research results without conversion of different measuring units. In that 
sense, ISO 362 created a common framework for research on car noise control, and 
FISITA meetings became central market places for ‘homogenized’ car noise control 
knowledge.97 Heightened attention to standardization and regulation also stimulated the 
integration of noise control and automobile engineering knowledge. In other words, ISO 
362 supported the rise of a new field of knowledge. Moreover, the institutionalization of 
noise control engineering as an emerging technical discipline established new places of 
knowledge exchange, which facilitated the circulation of knowledge between noise control 
engineers and automotive engineers. The former presented their knowledge at automotive 
events and the latter attended noise control engineering gatherings to share their 
knowledge. In 1971 the Institute of Noise Control Engineering, a professional society for 
noise control engineers, was founded in Washington, and the next year the International 
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Institute of Noise Control Engineering was founded as an association of several national 
professional organizations. Since 1973 the first organization has hosted national 
conferences, NOISE-CON, while since 1972 its international counterpart has hosted 
INTER-NOISE. With regular sessions on surface transportation noise both conference 
series stabilized the circulation of knowledge on car noise control.98 However, this now 
became a global rather than primarily a European phenomenon. 
 
The distinct American approach in car noise measurement and abatement can be 
interpreted as a partial appropriation, over time, of ISO 362. To understand the decision 
not to adopt ISO 362 as a standard, a brief look at the history of SAE 986a, the U.S. 
method for performing noise measurement is necessary. In the 1950s, the SAE 
implemented standards for trucks and buses, but it was not until July 1967 that a standard, 
J986a, was approved by the SAE Vehicle Noise Committee for passenger cars. It was 
generally based on ISO 362, but test site requirements, instrumentation specifications, 
microphone distance and procedural details drew from the prior standard for trucks and 
buses.99 One can say that SAE engineers appropriated the ISO recommendation to their 
specific noise measurement tradition. As a result, “differences between the SAE and ISO 
methods occur in microphone distance (15 versus 7.5 m) and among the various 
procedures in gear selection, initial vehicle speed, and so on.”100 Thereby, measuring 
distance is crucial: “If the same [15 m] level is legally requested, the vehicles in the United 
States can be made about 6 dBA noisier.”101  
 
European engineers hoped that international agreements would lead to an alteration 
of SAE 986a. But Americans were more attuned to their national context. Ralph K. 
Hillquist, from General Motors, admitted that studies in the U.S. and Canada had shown 
that “a 7.5 m microphone distance may be technically acceptable, but perhaps not so 
politically because the levels are approximately 5 dB higher at the nearer location.”102 Ford 
engineers, too, acknowledged that a 7.5 meter microphone distance had some advantages 
as signal/noise ratios improved at closer distances.103 But noise tests carried out at the 
‘European distance’ revealed why adoption was not wanted. A tested high-power sedan 
emitted 88.3 dB(A), which was 6.3 dB(A) above the EEC limit. Corrected to 15 meter, the 
result would be 82.3 dB(A) and comply with most U.S. regulation.104 
 
As the above suggests, there was tension between ISO 362 and SAE 986a in their 
different political and economic implications. Furthermore manufacturers were eager to 
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question the dependability of the test results at all. General Motors, for one, pleaded for an 
additional two decibel allowance, pointing out, that “recent studies into test parameters … 
indicate that significant variations in test results can occur.”105 In another study, Ford 
engineers compared seven test grounds and found significant measuring differences 
between them: for instance, Maremont Corp. test ground was 0.94 decibel louder than 
Ford’s own Michigan test site.106 European engineers, too, pointed out immanent reading 
and driving errors.107 The complaints are, at first, hard to understand as nearly all 
production cars passed the imposed noise limits in Europe,108 and the United States.109 
They can be conceived as an anticipation of future problems as stricter noise limits were 
already announced.110 Yet, it is possible to draw another explanation from the example of 
air pollution regulation: the contestation of regulation was a habitual defense reaction of 
the automotive industry. Manufacturers conceived (traffic noise) regulation as economic 
threat, which could impose extra design and compliance costs and thereby reduce 
profits.111 
 
Despite the contestation of car noise regulation, American and European 
automobile engineers had to integrate noise control knowledge into their automotive 
research practice. This can be seen by the investments of car manufacturers and research 
laboratories into new facilities with anechoic chambers, which were equipped with the 
latest electro-acoustical instruments.112 Outdoor test sites and sound chambers became 
central sites for car noise control research. They also symbolized two distinct approaches 
to how acoustics knowledge could improve car noise control. The idea of the first approach 
was to use sound level meters with dB(A) reading during the research process, because in 
the end automobiles had to meet a legally-specified limit in dB(A). As one author 
concluded: “The noise performance of a vehicle [should be considered] in the context of 
the particular conditions imposed by the specified test procedure, and that observations of 
variations of noise with time, during the test, can be useful in the diagnosis of the 
predominant source of noise.”113 Other engineers criticized the use of ISO pass-by 
procedure: “For research purposes the measurement of noise under these test conditions is 
difficult and time consuming and so measurements of individual vehicle sources, for 
example the engine, close to its surface and in a test cell are made.”114 The different 
research approaches emphasize that there were certain limitations to the creation of a 
common framework for developing knowledge on controlling car noise as laboratory 
practices differed significantly. 
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Narrative Construction of a European Car Identity 
 
In 1967, Erik d’Ornhjelm, president of the French chamber of car manufacturers, stated 
that the automobile industry had been successfully Europeanized.115 The customs union 
between the EEC members was approaching its completion and intra-Community car trade 
had already increased significantly. The successful harmonization of car noise regulations 
in Europe further strengthened that perception. What's more, the EEC legislation on 
maximum noise limits for new passenger cars established ‘Europe’ as political actor in the 
automotive field. However, the integration of the European automobile sector was not 
solely a technical, economic or political issue, but a “story … about the construction of the 
European identity.”116 Crucial in this identity discourse—as the history of car noise 
abatement suggests—was the European experience that the United States pursued their 
own national policy instead of joining international agreements. The UNECE accord on car 
noise revealed that it was easier to find a technical compromise between East and West 
European countries than one with the U.S. car industry. It was, thus, the political 
abstinence of the U.S. that helped to shape the impression of a common European 
approach. The same discursive mechanism can be observed in other concurrent discourses 
on a European car identity: here, too, American car technology served as a mirror in which 
common European features were highlighted. One can argue that the discourse on a 
‘European car’ helped to reach a common accord in car noise abatement, and that, at the 
same time, this agreement sustained the formation of a European car identity. Moreover, 
the EEC directives 70/156 and 70/157 stabilized and institutionalized the notion of the 
‘European car.’ To understand the entangled history of noise abatement and identity 
formation we need to take a final look at the latter process. 
 
One discursive strand on the ‘European car’ can be found in historical narratives, 
which appeared in automotive trade journals—written by engineers for their colleagues.117 
In 1958, the Journal de la SIA published an essay under the title ‘How European Motor 
Car Design evolved.’ According to this article’s author, the evolution of a distinctively 
European automobile already had started during the interwar years, whose identifying 
features included the rear engine concept and the self-supporting body without chassis.118 
Thus, the ‘European car’ predated the political integration process in this author’s 
historical narrative. In the postwar period, the author saw smallness and economy 
(especially as compared to American models) as further distinguishing attributes of the 
typical European car. These characteristics, and their causes, were critical in shaping 
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European discussion on the ‘European car.’ Briefly put, limited disposable income, 
automobile taxation, high fuel costs, and narrow roads in historical city centers motivated 
European engineers, despite their different national contexts, to develop small cars with 
small high-revving engines.119 During the interwar period, however, discussions in 
automotive trade journals differed significantly from postwar historical reflections. In the 
1920s, French and German engineers referred to American automobiles indeed, but only as 
a way to construct and demarcate their own national automobile cultures, and not the 
distinctiveness of a ‘European’ car culture. The styling of German car bodies, for example, 
was seen as different from American preferences.120 Such critique, in part, reflected a 
resistance to cosmopolitan or non-indigenous influences and urged for a distinct German 
way of car body design.121 At the same time, French commentators recognized differences 
in engine configuration and size between French and American automobiles, but, again, 
used the American example to define a particular French engine layout.122 
 
Another related strand in the postwar discourse can be found in accounts on the 
state of the art of automobile technology. But this time the opposition was semantically 
constructed between the typical ‘European car’ and the ‘American car,’ which was 
configured as large, high-powered, and comfortable. Here it was the otherness of the 
American car that formed the European car identity. This identity-building was based on 
simple social and technical dichotomies between America and Europe: high versus low 
income, low versus high fuel prices, wide versus narrow roads—big versus small cars, 
high-powered versus underpowered engines, automatic versus manual transmission, and so 
on.123 These dichotomies not only resulted from technical or economic causes; European-
based engineers underlined that the differences were deeply rooted in national, respectively 
European, driving cultures: the American public desired large, comfortable and luxurious 
cars with big V-8 engines and automatic transmission as status symbols. In contrast, during 
the reconstruction period, Europeans longed for cheap, small and economical cars as basic 
means of transportation. Later, they preferred middle-size cars with manual transmissions, 
which were sportier than American sedans.124  
 
By and large, the construction of the ‘European car’ was based on tendencies in 
American car technology different than those in Europe. During the 1950s, such 
differences in automotive technology were obvious: since the interwar period American 
cars had become larger and more powerful every year. In 1955, American manufacturers 
installed V-8 engines in 80 percent of all passenger cars produced, as the average 
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horsepower rose from 54hp in 1938 to 212 in 1955.125 At the same time, some of the iconic 
European cars like Fiat’s 500, Citroën’s 2 CV and Volkswagen’s Beetle, which competed 
in the same small car segment, were based on quite different engine technologies: a 12 hp 
two-cylinder rear engine, a 13 hp flat-twin front engine and a 30 hp flat-four rear engine. 
Between different market segments technological variations were even more obvious. For 
European manufacturers these product variations were a strategic strength in the 
competition for world export markets, in particular when their products complemented the 
domestic supply.126 
 
Already at the end of the 1950s, the small ‘European car’ had come to serve as a 
collective, transnational symbol in Europe.127 When American compacts were introduced 
in the early 1960s, such a perspective structured the comments of French and German 
engineers: the cars were of ‘European size’128 and had a ‘European design.’129 
Concurrently, European trade journals started to subsume the national motor shows under 
the label of ‘European motor shows.’ The once separate articles on the Paris, Frankfurt or 
Geneva motor show were now joined into one article.130 But ‘Europe,’ being more than 
just a geographic indicator, was also a leitmotif: authors used to identify converging 
developments in European automobile technology. This did not always seem justified, 
however: a German NSU Prinz and the luxurious French Citroën DS, for example, had 
technologically little in common but they were both subsumed under ‘European car’ 
technology. 
 
Another Europe-building practice was the semantic construction of a contrast 
between American and European engineering methods. In 1969, the new Audi 100 was 
presented as the new ‘European middle-class sedan.’ Ludwig Kraus, engineer of Auto 
Union, explained to the readers of the Automobiltechnische Zeitschrift that there had been 
four possible ways to design the new Audi: according to the American, European, sporty 
and radical fashion. ‘America’ was identified with simple technology, a stylish body and 
the cheapest price, whereas ‘Europe’ was equated with more sophisticated technology, a 
modern yet functional body styling and a slightly higher price.131 Even if this article 
conveyed blunt stereotypes it illustrates how the discourse on Europe had become 
entangled with other discourse fragments in the automotive field: here, it was no longer the 
German engineering genius, ‘Made in Germany,’ but the European engineering style that 
was superior to the American one. 
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The examples provided illustrate how historical narratives and the semantic 
construction of the typical ‘European car’ and of a distinct European way of engineering 
similarly contributed to the Europeanization of the automotive field. European engineers 
and representatives of manufacturers compared themselves with their American 
counterparts. One’s own distinct car identity seemed grounded in the alterity of the other 
side, but in contrast to the interwar period the national frames of reference were replaced 
by a European reference frame. In this respect, one may well speak of a reciprocal 
narrative construction of otherness. As a result, two imagined car communities emerged—
the American and the European.132 Certain technologies and concepts were branded as 
either European or American, which gave rise to an imagined Atlantic divide in car 
technology, driving and engineering culture. 
 
Conclusions 
  
The history of traffic noise abatement between 1950 and 1975 shows how international 
standardization of measuring car sound contributed to European integration. The ‘non-
political’ expert knowledge of ISO 362 was indeed a political compromise of European 
experts in TC 43. This standard then served as basis for the harmonization of technical 
regulation on the supranational level of EEC: a nice example of ‘hidden integration’ 
through engineering knowledge. But effects of international standardization reached 
beyond the Common Market, because UNECE also adopted ISO 362 as basis for 
international harmonization of technical regulation—opening broader European and world 
export markets for EEC car manufacturers. In addition, international traffic noise 
abatement had wider effects on knowledge integration between automobile engineering 
and acoustics. At the very same time, ISO 362 also fragmented the international 
automotive community, because the United States did not adopt it but issued a separate 
national standard. This step can be interpreted as a market protection strategy aimed at 
preserving the Atlantic divide in automobile technology—albeit one with moderate 
success, as import shares of European cars increased beginning in the late 1950s. 
 
In sum, it is possible to distinguish several different forms of integration: of 
markets, regulation and legislation; of expert communities and engineering knowledge; as 
well as of identity discourses. Integration did not run in parallel at all these layers, and the 
degree of integration depended on actors’ perspectives: from an American perspective 
trans-Atlantic market integration was very much advanced, from the European perspective 
23 
competition between European car manufacturers was rather moderate. In addition, 
integration was sometimes a rather contradictory process as automobile culture became 
Europeanized at the narrative level, but continued to be national in a material sense. 
However, in contrast to the interwar period, where differences between American and 
European automobile technology were categorized within national frames of reference, 
Europe became the point of reference after the war. The economic and political integration 
process of the EEC and the active role of EEC and UNECE in the international 
harmonization of car noise regulations, contributed to the notion of a common European 
approach in automobile development. 
 
The history of car noise control also illustrates that the emergence of a European 
car identity neither stimulated nor resulted in homogenization of car technology. The 
European automobile industry preserved a broad technological diversity.133 At the level of 
market integration, one can even argue that until the 1990s the automobile industry was the 
least integrated industry in Europe.134 The sense of ‘Europeanness,’ then, hardly originated 
in a common material basis. Rather, it was the perceived difference of American 
automobiles that helped to shape the idea of a shared European car identity. As a result, the 
automotive community in Western Europe embraced the ‘small European car’ as a 
collective symbol, which helped to constitute and enact ‘Europe’ as imagined automobile 
community—despite the fact that a great number of European cars did not fit into this 
stereotype. 
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